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Abstract
One of the pervasive problems with means-tested public long term care (LTC) programs
is their inability to prevent individuals who could a¤ord private long term services from
taking advantage of public care. They often manage to elude the means-test net through
strategic impoverishment. We show in a simple model how this problem comes about,
how it a¤ects welfare and how it can be mitigated.
JEL classication: H2, H5.
Keywords: Long term care, means-testing, strategic impoverishment, opting out, pub-
lic insurance, altruism.
1 Introduction
Public long-term care systems in the OECD are very heterogeneous across and within
countries. They vary in many ways: their generosity, the levels of government that
are involved, their universality. They are mainly provided by local authorities; they
generally cover only a fraction of the needs and range from universal and comprehensive
to means-tested systems. In this paper we focus on the means-tested systems that seems
to prevail in the majority of countries. The best known and the most studied of them
is the Medicaid program in the US, which covers about half of LTC provision for the
American elderly dependents.
Means-testing is rarely a rst choice. It is often adopted over universal arrangements
because it allows devoting scarce funds to those who need them the most. The problem
is that in the reality needy people do not always have access to means-tested programs
and well to do individuals can benet from them. Reasons for this paradoxical outcome
can be the fact that the neediest often lack relevant information to take up and fear
stigmatization more than the members of the middle class. This take up problemis
well documented for many means tested programs1. Within the context of LTC, Norton
(1995) for instance argues that some households who could benet from Medicaid prefer
not to do so by fear of stigmatization.
In this paper we focus on the opposite problem namely that individuals who are
in principle not eligible manage to elude the means-test and end up receiving benets.
This issue is particularly relevant in the area of means-tested public LTC. The reasons
are varied. First there is a range of strategies that lead the beneciaries to impoverish
themselves so as to be eligible. This is called in the US the Medicaid impoverishment
technique. Second, most LTC programs seem to favor aid to people who are institution-
alized and are unable after a few years to meet their nancial obligations. Low-income
families are rarely in this situation. Third, the means-test is often dened in a rather
1See Curie and Gahvari (2008) for a survey.
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vague and ambiguous way. To be more precise, the very concept of meansis left vague.
Does it concern the income ows or the assets of the beneciary? Is there a possibil-
ity of recouping part of what has been paid by the government at the time of death?
Can children be asked to nance their parents LTC expenses before the government
intervenes? The law is not clear on that. To take the example of France where there
are two means-tested programs for LTC, the PSD (Prestation Spécique Dépendance)
and the APA (Allocation Personalisée dAutonomie), the rst one can recuperate its
participation on the estate of the beneciary, whereas the second cannot.
Finally and above all, there is a political economy issue. For some reason there very
often appears to be a signicant political resistance against the e¤ective enforcement
of some aspects of the means-test, when the underlying program concerns dependent
people. Attempts by the French PSD or the US Medicaid administration to recuperate
expenses from the estate of a person who has beneted for years from means-tested
services, often make the headlines of newspapers and are perceived as unpopular by the
majority of public opinion. In these two countries and many others there exist estate
recovery programs that are intended to enable states to recoup their expenses upon a
beneciarys death. In reality, however, the rate of recovery is extremely low2.
This paper presents a simple model which shows how this problem of strategic
impoverishment comes about, how it a¤ects welfare and how it can be mitigated. It
takes a normative viewpoint and studies the provision of a social LTC in a setting of
asymmetric information. We assume throughout the paper that public care cannot
be topped up. Specically, one can think of purchasing home care services using
ones own, and ones childrens, resources versus government provision of a minimum
2 In this paper we do not make the distinction between income and wealth. Recently, Dilnot (2011)
dealt with the concern that in the UK most dependent people were incurring costs that would force
them to sell all their assets. He suggested individualscontribution to their long term care costs should
be capped at about £ 35,000, after which they will be eligible for full State support. He also suggested
the means-tested threshold, above which people are liable for their full care costs, should be increased
from £ 23,250 to £ 100,000.
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facility. The crucial point is that one consumes either one or the other. The crucial
idea represented in our model is that individual wealth may not be observable because
parents can transfer part of it to their children. This complicates the implementation of
means-tested programs. In other words, the mean-test is based on the parents reported
level of their own wealth. However, only the wealth left after a possible transfer to their
children is observable.
We adopt the simplest setting that allows us to represent the problems main fea-
tures. There are two types of families. The rst type, labeled altruistic, consists of
a parent and a child who share the same welfare function. The second type, labeled
selsh, is composed of a parent and a child who have no links. We assume away pri-
vate insurance for LTC. The altruistic family is assumed to be relatively well o¤. In
case of dependency, the altruistic parent will get a good level of LTC because of his
own resources or because of the aid from his child. The selsh parent is poor, so that
without government intervention he will be in very bad shape in case of dependence.
We concentrate on the provision of public LTC nanced through some form of taxation.
All other taxes are taken as given (the income and wealth levels considered are already
net of these taxes). In case of perfect information, the government will only help the
selsh dependent. Assume now that the government does not observe who is altruistic
and who is not, nor the resources of the parents. The altruistic dependent parent can
now claim to be poor and obtain public LTC benets by giving his assets to his child
or alternatively forego any assistance from his children. We analyze three approaches
that can be combined. The rst one relies purely on a process of self-selection. Since
the LTC benet cannot be supplemented by private resources, if its quantity/quality
is not very high, those with enough resources or with family support will be deterred
from using the means-tested scheme. In other words, to achieve self-selection a lower
than otherwise optimal level of LTC is provided and this has of course a welfare cost.
Second, we introduce the possibility that individual types (before transfer wealth) can
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be observed at some cost (through some kind of audit technology). This possibility
relaxes the self-selection constraint and thus mitigates the welfare cost of asymmetric
information. The optimal policy balances this benet against the cost of the audits.
The third approach consists in taxing intergenerational transfers (and specically inter
vivos gifts). Such a tax has the e¤ect of facilitating the enforcement of means-test.
However, it also restricts parentsability to help their needy children.
2 The model
We consider a society consisting of an equal number of two types of families indexed i =
A and S for altruist and selsh. In each type, the child has an income yi and consumes
ci, which gives him a utility u(ci); the parent is dependent and has an income (or
wealth) wi and enjoys a level of care mi, which gives him a utility u(mi). For simplicity,
we assume that dependency occurs with probability 1. Allowing for a lower and more
realistic probability would not change the main results. For the similar reasons, we use
the same utility function for the child and his dependent parent and assume u(0) = 0.
In an altruistic family, the parent and the child use total resources yA + wA to nance
both the consumption cA and the care mA so that cA = mA = (yA+wA)=2: In a selsh
family, one simply has cS = yS and mS = wS .
A utilitarian government with unrestricted tools and full information would set cA =
mA = cS = mS = (yA+wA+yS+wS)=4. All levels of consumption and care are equalized
within and between families.
Assume now that the utilitarian government can only use a at tax  on all in-
comes to nance a public LTC g: For simplicity, we assume that wS = yS = 0.3 The
3 If yS and wS are positive, we have
u0(cA)
yA + wA
Y
+ u0(cS)
yS
Y
= u0(mS)
h
1  wS
Y
i
;
where Y = wA + wS + yA + yS and cA = mA.
This is of no relevance to our results as long as wS is not too large.
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governments problem is then given by
max

2u

yA + wA
2
(1  )

+ u[(yA + wA)];
which yields mS = g =  [yA + wA] = cA = mA. In words, the poor selsh parents
receive a level of public care which is exactly equal to the private care enjoyed by the
wealthier altruistic parents.
Let us now turn to the case where types are not publicly observable. It is then
tempting for the altruistic family to claim that the parent is resourceless and entitled
to receiving g. By assumption if he gets g, he cannot combine it with other type of
resources. In other words, topping up of public benets is not possible. The governments
problem is then subject to the following self-selection constraint stating that the altruists
are better o¤ telling the truth than mimicking the selsh dependent.
2u

(yA + wA) (1  )
2

 u(g) + u ((yA + wA) (1  )) (1)
If this constraint is binding it can we written as
2u(c) = u(g) + u(2c) () u(g) = 2u(c)  u(2c) (2)
where
c =
(yA + wA) (1  )
2
:
Equation (2) implicitly denes g as a function of c, g = bg(c). The functional form ofbg(c) depends on the degree of the concavity of u, through the term 2u(c)   u(2c). To
illustrate this assume that u(x) = x(1 ")= (1  ") :Then one has
bg(c) = c h2  2(1 ")i 11 "
which yields bg(c) = 0 for " = 0 and bg(c) = c for " =1: Di¤erentiating the RHS of this
expression shows that bg increases with the concavity parameter " and with c.
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The Lagrangean expression associated with the problem of the utilitarian govern-
ment is then given by
$1 = 2u [c] + u(g)   [g + 2c  (yA + wA)]
+  [g   bg(c)] ;
where we have used the assumption that u(cS) = u(yS) = 0 and where u(c) = u(cA) =
u(mA), while u(g) = u(mS). The FOCs are:
u0(g)     = 0
and
2u0(c)  2  bg0(c) = 0
Combining these expressions yields
u0(g) >  > u0(c);
so that mA > mS = g. In words, to satisfy the self-selection constraint, public care
is lower than private care (in altruistic family). Asymmetric information penalizes the
selsh dependent to the benet of the altruists. It is worth noting that this result is
independent of the way resources are divided between wA and yA. This will no longer
be the case with taxation of gifts.
3 Audits
We now introduce the possibility of (random) audits at some cost. An audit is supposed
to reveal individual types. In our context this means that it shows if strategic impov-
erishment has taken place or not. If someone can a¤ord paying for his own LTC and
nevertheless benet from g, he will have to pay a penalty 'g where ' > 1 if audited.
Then, we write the self-selection constraint as:
2u

yA + wA)(1  )
2

  u(g)  (1  p)u  ((yA + wA)(1  ))
+pu ((yA + wA) (1  )  'g) = 0:
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Auditing is costly. The cost depends on the frequency of audit p and is denoted k(p)
We have thus to modify the revenue constraint as follows:
 (yA + wA) = g + k (p) ;
where k0 (p) > 0 and k00 (p) > 0: As usual we have a convex cost function.
We now have a new Lagrangian:
$2 = 2u(c) + u(g)  (g + 2c  yA   wA + k (p))
+  [2u(c)  u(g)  (1  p)u(2c)  pu (2c  'g)] :
This yields the following FOCs:
@L2
@g
= u0(g)    [u0(g)  pu0(2c  'g)']
@L2
@p
=  k0(p) + [u(2c)  u(2c  'g)]:
@L2
@c
= u0(c)   [u0(c)  (1  p)u0(2c)  pu0 (2c  'g)]
The parameter ' is given; if it could be freely chosen, one would go back to the rst-best
solution. The same would hold if audits were free. In general, we have
u0(c) =

1 + 
+

1 + 
u0(2c)  p  u0(2c)  u0 (2c  'g) (3)
u0(g) =

1    

1 + 
pu0 (2c  'g)' (4)
These rules suggest that the possibility of audits tends to lead to a more generous level
of g. To be more precise, the gap between c = mA (the level of care received by the
wealthy altruist) and g (the level of care of the poor selsh) is lower, at least for given
levels of the multipliers  and . To see this, combining (3) and (4) and noting that
setting p = 0 (or ' = 0) brings us back to the no audit case we have

u0(c)
u0(g)

p=0
=

1 + 
+

1 + 
u0(2c)

1  
<

u0(c)
u0(g)

p>0
=

1 + 
+

1 + 
u0(2c)  p (u0(2c)  u0 (2c  'g))

1    

1 + 
pu0 (2c  'g)'
7
With p or ' equal to 0, u0(g) = =(1 ). With p = 1, or ' very large, u0(g) = . Note
that all these comparisons are based on rules; since the multipliers are endogenous we
cannot compare the actual levels.
To sum up, audits which disclose strategic impoverishment can be used as a (partial)
substitute to the degradation of public care which is otherwise necessary to properly
target the benets (in a self-selecting way).
4 Taxation of gifts
We now turn to the case where inter vivos gifts can be taxed. Descending gifts occur
when altruistic parents are richer than their children which is the case on which we
concentrate. We posit that these gifts made by wealthy parents to their children can
be subjected to some linear tax . Denoting by B the gift, the altruistic family has to
solve the following problem:
maxu(yA(1  ) +B(1  )) + u(wA(1  ) B)
which yields the optimal value of B that is denoted by B and that is dependent on
both  and  : The FOC is:
 = u0(cA)(1  )  u0(mA) = 0
and then:
dB
d
=
u0(cA)
 B

RR(cA)
(1  )B
cA
  1

(5)
where B is the SOC of the above problem. This expression shows that the tax can
decrease or increase the level of the gift. Intuitively one might at rst expect the tax
to reduce the level of the gift. However, as any price change, a variation of the gift
tax creates both a substitution and an income e¤ect. The gift tax has a positive e¤ect
on the level of gift if the concavity of utility (relative risk aversion or complementarity
between cA and mA) is big enough. Clearly if c and m were perfect substitutes there
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would be no gift as soon as  > 0: To the contrary if they were perfect complements,
gifts would be adjusted to compensate for the tax loss.4 More specically expression (5)
shows that the threshold level of RR above which is gift increases with the tax is larger
than 1. Consequently, with a log utility for which RR = 1 we have dB=d < 0.5
The Lagrangian expression is now given by
$3 = u
 
yA(1  ) +B(1  )

+ u
 
wA(1  ) B

+ u(g)
  g   (yA + wA)  B
+ 

u(yA(1  ) +B(1  )

+ u
 
wA(1  ) B
  u(g)
  u yA(1  ) + wA(1  )(1  )
where B = B ( ; ). Observe that the mimicking altruists transfer their entire wealth
to their children to qualify for public LTC. Recall that the mimicked type S individuals
have no resources. This of course reects the idea of strategic impoverishment which is
at the heart of this paper.
To make the presentation simple, we further assume that  is given; in other words,
there is only one way to nance a variation in g, through a tax on gifts. The FOCs
with respect to g and  can be written as follows:
u0(g)  
(1  ) = 0 (6)
u0(cA) =

(1 + )
(1 + ) +

(1 + )
u0(~cA)
wA
B
(1  ) = 0 (7)
where ~cA = yA(1   ) + wA(1   ) (1  ) is the childrens consumption in case of
mimicking and
 =
@B
B@
;
the elasticity of bequests with respect to the tax rate. Naturally we have ~cA > cA.
To interpret these equations, we proceed in di¤erent steps. Let us rst assume that
mimicking is not possible because types are observable ( = 0). We then have a simple
4To illustrate this in the simplest possible way, take the extreme case where yA = 0 and  = 0.
Under perfect complementarity we then obtain wA   B = B(1   ), so that B = wA=(2   ) which
increases with .
5Except when yA = 0, in which case we have have cA = B(1  ) and dB=d = 0.
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formula
u0 (cA) = u0(g) [1 + ] ;
or
u0 (cA)
u0 (g)
T 1 i¤  T 0
so that
cA S g i¤  T 0
In words, if the e¤ect of the tax on gifts is negative (positive), the level of consumption
of the altruistic child will be larger (smaller) than the level of public care received by
the selsh parent. Remember that cA < mA as long as  > 0. Put di¤erently, when
 has the expected sign (namely negative) we continue to have a quality degraded
public care. However, when gifts increase with the tax, the result might be reversed so
that public care would exceed private care. Recall that we are in the case where types
are observable (so that self-selection is not an issue).
We now reintroduce the self-selection constraint but assume that the tax on gifts
is non distortionary. That is, it is not proportional to B but lump-sum and denoted .
The family utility of the altruists is now given by
u(yA(1  ) +B) + u(wA(1  ) +B   );
and the FOC is
u0(cA) = u0(mA):
In that case we have
@$3
@
=  u0(cA)(1 + ) + + u0(~cA)
so that
u0 (cA)
u0 (g)
= 1     (1  )


u0(cA)  u0(~cA)

< 1:
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which implies that g < cA = mA. In other words we return to the case where quality of
public care is degraded as compared to private care.
Let us now turn to the general case with both a binding incentive constraint and a
distortionary gift tax. Combining the FOCs (6) and (7) and rearranging yields
u0 (cA)
u0 (g)
= (1  ) (1 + )   (1  )


u0(cA)  u0(~cA)(1  )wA
B

: (8)
While equation (8) is rather simple, it does not yield a straightforward and unambiguous
comparison between cA; mA and g. Since the rst setting considered above, name
the case where types are observable, has shown some ambiguity, this in itself is not
surprising. Still, based on the above results one would have conjectured that mA >
cA > g always obtains for  < 0, while a positive gift-tax elasticity might give rise to
some ambiguity. However, a simple inspection of the expression 8) shows that this is not
immediately obvious. While the rst term on the RHS is then indeed smaller than 1,
we cant determine the sign of the second term. In words, without further specication
we cannot assert whether the poor dependent will be worse o¤ than the child of the rich
dependent.
To get some more insight, let us look at some special cases. Assume yA =  = 0
and that u(x) = x1 "=(1  "). In that case, the term in brackets on the RHS is positive
(negative) for " > (<)1 or equivalently  > (<)0.6 Note that when " = 1 we have
u0(cA)
u0(g)
= 1   < 1:
In other words, with a logarithmic utility, g < cA < mA. By continuity, when " > 1 is
close to 1 we maintain the result that mA > cA > g. For high values of " (or ) the
term in brackets is positive but the term (1  )(1 + ) can be large. On the other way
around, for low values of ", the term in brackets is negative and (1  )(1+ ) can turn
negative. The signs of the two terms are then reversed so that the ambiguity persists.
6u0(cA)  u0(~cA)wAB = (1 )
 
B

B1    w1 A

? 0
iff  ? 1
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5 Conclusion
One of the pervasive problems with means-tested LTC programs is their inability at
avoiding abuses, namely that individuals who can a¤ord directly or through their family
paying for their own LTC manage to get through the means tests and thus endanger the
sustainability of the system. The purpose of this paper was to present a formalization
of what can be called strategic impoverishment and the ways it can be avoided or at
least mitigated. Three devices were analyzed. In the rst the public benece is kept so
low that altruistic families prefer not to use it for their own dependent. In other words,
since the means-testing is imperfect and can be circumvented it may be necessary to
supplement it by a mechanism that relies on self-selection. This is possible as long as
the public benets cannot be supplemented by private resources. Second, we show that
if making the testing for means is not too costly the self-selection constraint can be
relaxed and the public benet made more generous. The third avenue we explored was
that of introducing an inter vivos gift tax which makes less attractive for well to do
elderly to pass their wealth to their children and use the public compensation. While
this appears to be intuitively appealing, our results suggest that this instrument may
be less e¤ective than one could have expected.
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